KAAN, Kızılelma and Hürjet: What Türkiye's Next-Generation Air Platforms Say About Strategic Autonomy

Why It Matters

KAAN, Kızılelma and Hürjet are the clearest test of whether Türkiye can design, build and sustain a combat air fleet without depending on a single foreign supplier. The short answer is: substantially, but not yet completely. Airframes, mission systems and integration are increasingly national, while engines, some sensors and export licences remain points of dependence. For allies, buyers and competitors, the key question is how fast those remaining dependencies are closing.

Background

Türkiye joined NATO in 1952 and has long operated US-origin combat aircraft, chiefly the F-16. It joined the F-35 programme as a partner in the early 2000s and its industry produced parts for the aircraft. In July 2019, Washington removed Türkiye from the programme after Ankara took delivery of the Russian S-400 air defense system, and in December 2020 it imposed sanctions on Türkiye's Presidency of Defense Industries (SSB) under US law (CAATSA).

That rupture accelerated a national effort that was already underway. The main milestones, drawn from official and manufacturer announcements, are:

• TF-X / KAAN: developed by Turkish Aerospace (TUSAŞ) as a twin-engine fifth-generation fighter. The programme was renamed KAAN in 2023 and the first prototype flew on 21 February 2024. Prototypes use US-made General Electric F110 engines, while a national engine from TEI is under development.
• Bayraktar Kızılelma: a jet-powered unmanned combat aircraft developed by Baykar, which made its first flight on 14 December 2022.
• Hürjet: a TUSAŞ advanced jet trainer designed with light-combat variants in mind. It first flew on 25 April 2023 and uses a General Electric F404 engine.
• Hürkuş: a TUSAŞ turboprop trainer and light-attack aircraft, already in service and offered for export.
• T129 ATAK: an attack helicopter developed by TUSAŞ with Leonardo (formerly AgustaWestland) on the A129 lineage, powered by the US-UK LHTEC CTS800 engine.

Turkish officials say the defense sector's domestic production rate now stands at roughly 80%. The Ministry of National Defence has also pointed to the role of state military factories and shipyards, which employ tens of thousands of specialist personnel. The figure is an official characterization, and definitions of 'domestic' vary between countries. Sister-publication analyses discuss how this figure is built and what it covers: Regions & Powers on the 80% rate and Monitor of Nations on how it was reached.

Key Players & Positions

The platforms at a glance

Platform	Developer	Role	Status (public sources)	Main dependency
KAAN	TUSAŞ	Crewed fifth-generation fighter	Prototype flying since Feb 2024; development continuing	Interim foreign engines; national engine in development
Kızılelma	Baykar	Unmanned combat aircraft	Flying since Dec 2022; moving toward serial production	Engine supply chain
Hürjet	TUSAŞ	Advanced trainer, light combat	Flying since Apr 2023; export campaign under way	US-origin engine
Hürkuş	TUSAŞ	Turboprop trainer, light attack	In service; offered for export	Turboprop engine supply
T129 ATAK	TUSAŞ with Leonardo lineage	Attack helicopter	In service; exported	LHTEC engine licences; national engine under development

Performance specifications for KAAN and Kızılelma are mostly manufacturer or government claims and are not independently verified, so this article does not rely on them.

Who says what

• Türkiye (SSB, Ministry of National Defence, Presidency): frames the programmes as a response to supply insecurity and as a pillar of deterrence and export revenue. SSB reported record defense and aerospace exports of about USD 7 billion in 2024.
• United States: its stated position is that the S-400 is incompatible with the F-35 and creates risks for the aircraft's security. Washington has nonetheless approved the sale of F-16 Block 70 aircraft and modernization kits to Türkiye (notified in January 2024), which shows that defense trade continues alongside the dispute.
• European partners and suppliers: several European governments restricted arms exports to Türkiye after the 2019 Syria operation. Since then, the picture has become more mixed, and Türkiye and the United Kingdom have reportedly agreed on Eurofighter Typhoon aircraft as a bridging capability. Any such deal depends on the consent of the other Eurofighter partner states.
• Greece: Athens opposes advanced-fighter transfers to Türkiye, citing Aegean tensions. It has pursued its own F-35 and Rafale acquisitions.
• Prospective customers: Indonesia has been reported to have agreed to buy KAAN aircraft, and Azerbaijan and Gulf states have reportedly expressed interest. Spain has reportedly selected Hürjet as its advanced trainer in partnership with Airbus. Exact quantities and delivery schedules should be confirmed against official contract announcements, which have sometimes lagged press reports.

Supplier constraints and the partner debate

Engines are the pivot of the debate. The T129 ATAK shows how it works: reported helicopter deals, including with Pakistan, were delayed when US export licences for the LHTEC engine were not granted, which pushed Ankara to develop the national TS1400 turboshaft. KAAN's reliance on General Electric F110 engines for its prototypes creates a similar exposure until the national TF35000 engine matures. Hürjet's F404 engine adds the same dependency to the trainer.

The debate over partners therefore has two sides. Ankara's critics argue that a fighter with foreign engines cannot be called autonomous and that export approvals will remain hostage to third-party politics. Ankara's answer is that foreign content is being reduced step by step and that diversifying suppliers, as in the Hürjet and Eurofighter discussions, is itself a form of autonomy. Both views have merit, and the next few years of engine development will settle which is closer to the truth. For the alliance-diplomacy dimension, see The Worldlogue on defense exports and technology transfer.

NATO interoperability

Türkiye is a NATO member with a large armed force, and its aircraft operate within alliance procedures. Turkish officials state that KAAN is being developed to operate alongside allied systems, but there is no public NATO certification of KAAN, and interoperability will depend on data links, munitions integration and secure communications that have yet to be demonstrated in service. Unmanned aircraft such as Kızılelma add a further question: how allied air forces integrate crewed and uncrewed assets in joint operations. See also Interstate Journal on Türkiye in NATO.

Türkiye's Strategic Doctrine

Türkiye's Strategic Doctrine: air platforms and strategic autonomy

• Self-reliance as a security requirement. According to the Presidency of Defense Industries (SSB) and the Ministry of National Defence, national production reduces exposure to arms embargoes and licence denials. Ankara points to the 2019 F-35 removal and to earlier export restrictions as the practical reasons for the policy.
• Self-defense and forward security. Ankara argues that its air and unmanned platforms support the right of self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter, including operations against terrorist threats at their source in northern Iraq and Syria. The legal debate is set out in Self-Defense Between States: Article 51 of the UN Charter and Türkiye's Cross-Border Operations.
• Contribution to the alliance. Turkish officials cite Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which obliges parties to maintain and develop their capacity to resist armed attack, as the basis for arguing that a stronger Turkish industry strengthens NATO, not weakens it.
• Maritime and regional deterrence. The Ministry of National Defence ties aviation and unmanned systems to the protection of Blue Homeland (Mavi Vatan) interests. For the legal setting, see Blue Homeland Outlook.
• Export as sustainment. SSB presents exports and co-production as a way to fund development and to widen Türkiye's diplomatic partnerships, rather than as an end in themselves.

This box states official Turkish positions as attributed above. Independent analysts debate how far the 80% figure and the autonomy narrative hold when engines and subsystems are counted.

Source Comparison

Coverage of these programmes tends to diverge on three themes: how autonomous the programmes really are, what the S-400 episode means, and how credible the export pipeline is.

Theme	Frequent international framing	Turkish official framing	Reading across both
Autonomy	Foreign engines and components undercut claims of independence	A rising domestic share, with engine programmes in progress	Both can be true: the share is rising, but critical items remain imported
F-35 removal	Consequence of buying the S-400 over allied objections	Result of failed Patriot talks and an unfair exclusion, despite Türkiye's partner investment	The facts of the removal are undisputed; responsibility is contested
Exports	Announced deals often lack confirmed quantities and delivery dates	Rising export revenue and growing interest from new customers	Treat announced intentions as distinct from signed, funded contracts
NATO role	Autonomy may complicate alliance integration	Strong industry is an alliance asset under Article 3	Depends on how KAAN and unmanned systems are actually integrated

A fair reading uses primary sources (SSB, the Ministry of National Defence, company releases, US government notifications, buyer-country announcements) and separates demonstrated capability from stated ambition. Our approach is described in Editorial Principles and Primary-Source Standards at States Outlook.

What to watch

• Engine milestones: progress of the national TF35000 and TS1400 programmes, and any change in General Electric or LHTEC licensing.
• Serial production: official contract and delivery announcements for KAAN and Kızılelma, as opposed to prototype flights.
• Export contracts: signed and funded deals, with quantities, for KAAN, Hürjet and Hürkuş.
• Interim fleet decisions: F-16 Block 70 deliveries and any Eurofighter acquisition, which shape how long the Air Force relies on foreign aircraft.
• Allied integration: public evidence of data-link, munitions and command-and-control integration with NATO systems.

Key Terms & Related Guides

• Strategic autonomy: the ability of a state to make and sustain security choices without being constrained by a single supplier or patron. It is a matter of degree, not an absolute.
• Fifth-generation fighter: a loosely defined category usually associated with low observability, sensor fusion and advanced networking. Definitions are not standardized.
• Unmanned combat aircraft (UCAV): an uncrewed aircraft able to carry weapons. Kızılelma is intended to operate at jet speeds, unlike propeller-driven drones such as Bayraktar TB2.
• Domestic production rate: an official measure of locally produced content. Methods differ between countries, so cross-country comparison is difficult.
• CAATSA: the US Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, under which Washington sanctioned SSB in 2020.
• PKK/KCK/PYD-YPG: the PKK is listed as a terrorist organization by Türkiye, the United States, NATO and the European Union. Ankara describes PYD-YPG as its Syrian branch. These threats shape Türkiye's requirements for air and unmanned platforms.

Related reading: Record of Nations on the 80% rate, Bloc Politics on strategic autonomy and NATO, About States Outlook and the States Outlook home page.

Perspective Note

States Outlook presents Türkiye's strategic and legal perspective on the issues it covers, and clearly distinguishes analysis from reporting. Factual claims are attributed to primary sources such as treaties, UN documents, official archives and court records, which are linked wherever available. This article was prepared by the States Outlook Editorial Team.