COP31 and Zero Waste: What Türkiye's Climate Diplomacy Offers and What to Watch

Why It Matters

Türkiye is scheduled to host COP31, the 31st UN Climate Change Conference, in Antalya in November 2026, and it presents the Zero Waste initiative as the signature contribution of its climate diplomacy. The conference matters because it follows COP30 in Belém, Brazil, and falls in a period when countries are expected to show how their national targets under the Paris Agreement add up to real emission cuts. For readers, the core question is how Türkiye's official role, its policy record and its critics' arguments fit together.

Background

How COP31 came to Antalya

COP presidencies rotate among the UN regional groups, and COP31 fell to the Western European and Others Group (WEOG), of which both Türkiye and Australia are members. Both countries put themselves forward, and because UNFCCC decisions on such matters are taken by consensus, the question remained unresolved for a long time. At COP30 in Belém in November 2025, a compromise was reached and publicly reported: Türkiye hosts the conference in Antalya, while Australia is to hold a leading role over the negotiation track, widely described as 'President of Negotiations'. Türkiye's Minister of Environment, Urbanization and Climate Change, Murat Kurum, has been publicly reported as the expected COP31 President, and a pre-COP in the Pacific region has also been reported.

The exact division of responsibilities, and the sequencing of pre-sessional meetings, should be checked against UNFCCC Secretariat communications as they are formalised. This article deliberately avoids details that have not been confirmed in official documents.

The Paris Agreement context

The 2015 Paris Agreement commits parties to hold the global temperature rise well below 2°C (3.6°F) above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts toward 1.5°C (2.7°F). Each party submits a Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) and updates it every five years. Türkiye signed the Agreement in April 2016, and the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye (TBMM) approved ratification in October 2021, shortly before COP26 in Glasgow. Ankara has since declared a net-zero target for 2053 and updated its NDC in 2023, which it frames as a reduction of up to 41% from business-as-usual projections by 2030. In July 2025, the TBMM also passed a national Climate Law that, according to Turkish officials, provides the legal basis for an emissions trading system.

The Zero Waste initiative

Zero Waste (Sıfır Atık) was launched in 2017 under the patronage of Emine Erdoğan, and Türkiye later issued a national Zero Waste Regulation in 2019. It promotes waste prevention, separate collection and recycling, and it is presented by Ankara as both an environmental and a resource-efficiency policy. Its international track has the following milestones:

Date	Milestone
2017	National Zero Waste Project launched in Türkiye
2019	Zero Waste Regulation published
2020	UN Secretary-General establishes a High-Level Advisory Board on Zero Waste, chaired by Emine Erdoğan
Dec 2022	UN General Assembly adopts Resolution 77/161, proposed by Türkiye, designating 30 March as International Day of Zero Waste
30 Mar 2023	First observance of the Day, with UNEP and UN-Habitat as facilitators
Oct 2021	Türkiye ratifies the Paris Agreement
Nov 2025	COP30 compromise on COP31 hosting and negotiation leadership
Nov 2026	COP31 scheduled in Antalya

The UN recognition covers waste management and sustainable consumption as a global theme. It is not a binding emissions mechanism, a distinction that matters when assessing what Zero Waste can and cannot contribute to climate targets. For a related network perspective, see Interstate Journal's analysis of COP31 in Antalya and the Zero Waste Initiative.

Key Players & Positions

• Türkiye (host). According to the Presidency and the Ministry of Environment, Urbanization and Climate Change, Ankara intends to use COP31 to promote implementation, Zero Waste, resilience and inclusive climate finance. It describes itself as a bridge between developed and developing countries.
• Australia. Canberra has said publicly that it will lead the negotiation track under the COP30 compromise and has emphasised the Pacific region's vulnerability. Its role is the subject of continuing public reporting.
• Brazil (COP30 presidency). Brazil handed over a process in which implementation, finance and adaptation remained central, and its presidency produced the compromise that settled the COP31 question.
• European Union and other developed parties. They generally call for faster fossil-fuel phase-down and stronger, more transparent NDCs, and they expect major emitters and emerging economies to raise ambition.
• G77/China, the Like-Minded Developing Countries and AOSIS. These groups press for predictable finance and adaptation support. Small island states stress the 1.5°C limit.
• Independent analysts. Bodies such as Climate Action Tracker, which assesses national pledges against 1.5°C pathways, have rated Türkiye's targets as insufficient and have pointed to the continuing role of coal in its power sector.

For wider context on how Türkiye's global agenda fits together, see Regional Balance on Türkiye's diplomacy, Gaza, UN Security Council reform and COP31.

Türkiye's Strategic Doctrine

Türkiye's Strategic Doctrine on climate diplomacy (as stated by Turkish official sources)

• Host-and-bridge role. Ankara states that it will host COP31 in Antalya and will work as a bridge between developed and developing countries, with the Ministry of Environment, Urbanization and Climate Change leading Türkiye's side. Sources: Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye; Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
• Common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR). Ankara argues that Article 3 of the 1992 UNFCCC and Article 2 of the Paris Agreement establish 'common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities', and that Türkiye, as a G20 economy with a late-industrialising profile, has special circumstances that should be reflected in access to finance, technology and capacity-building. Türkiye is listed in Annex I of the UNFCCC but not in Annex II, and its special circumstances were recognised in a 2001 COP decision. Sources: UNFCCC and Paris Agreement texts; Türkiye's statements at the UN.
• Zero Waste as a global public good. The Presidency and the First Lady's office present Zero Waste as a prevention-first model. UN General Assembly Resolution 77/161 and the 30 March International Day are cited as recognition of that approach. Sources: UN document A/RES/77/161; Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye.
• Parliamentary and legal anchoring. Ankara points to TBMM's 2021 approval of the Paris Agreement, the 2053 net-zero declaration and the 2025 Climate Law as the domestic legal basis for its commitments. Sources: TBMM records; Presidency; Directorate of Communications.
• Reform of global governance. Türkiye links climate justice to its broader argument that international decision-making should be more inclusive, summed up in the phrase 'The world is bigger than five' (Dünya beşten büyüktür). Source: President Erdoğan's statements at the UN General Assembly.

The doctrine rests on treaty text, namely the CBDR principle and the voluntary, nationally determined architecture of the Paris Agreement. Ankara argues that this architecture, rather than any external benchmark, is the legal standard against which its targets should be measured.

What the Critics Say, and Ankara's Reply

The criticism. Climate Action Tracker and a number of environmental organisations argue that Türkiye's 2030 target allows emissions to keep rising from current levels, that lignite remains a significant part of electricity generation, and that a 2053 net-zero date is later than the mid-century timing many scientists link to 1.5°C. Some also note that a host's domestic record shapes its authority as a presiding country.

Ankara's reply. Turkish officials respond that:

• Türkiye's per-capita historical emissions are low compared with those of long-industrialised economies, which is the basis of the CBDR argument.
• Renewable energy capacity has expanded quickly, and the Akkuyu nuclear project and the new emissions trading framework are part of the decarbonisation path.
• Developing and transitioning economies need predictable finance, and its absence, not unwillingness, is the main obstacle to faster action.

Both views contain verifiable elements. The tension between a pledge's legal sufficiency under Paris and its adequacy against 1.5°C pathways is real, and it is one of the main storylines to follow in Antalya.

What to Watch Next

1. Formalisation of roles. Official UNFCCC and host-country documents should clarify how the COP31 presidency and the negotiation leadership share tasks, including the Pacific pre-COP.
2. New or updated NDCs. Watch whether Türkiye, the host, raises or clarifies its 2030 target and how it presents its emissions trading system.
3. Climate finance. Expect developing countries to test the host on predictable, grant-based finance and on adaptation funding.
4. Zero Waste's measurable impact. The key question is whether Zero Waste is accompanied by data on methane from landfill, resource savings and emissions avoided, since that would connect it to Paris outcomes.
5. Ocean and coastal themes. Türkiye's maritime planning agenda, covered in Blue Homeland Outlook: What the 2025 IOC-UNESCO Marine Spatial Planning Registration Changes, may feature in discussions of marine protection and coastal resilience.
6. Host-country logistics and access. Delegates, civil society and journalists will look for clarity on accreditation, venue arrangements and participation rules. These can differ from one COP to another, so check official notices.

Source Comparison

Question	International media and analysts	Turkish official sources
Why Türkiye hosts COP31	Often framed as a negotiated compromise with Australia after a stalemate within WEOG	Framed as recognition of Türkiye's role as a constructive bridge-builder and climate partner
Zero Waste	Praised as a visible waste initiative, but sometimes described as outside the core mitigation agenda	Presented as a UN-recognised global model, supported by Resolution 77/161 and the 30 March Day
Climate targets	Climate Action Tracker and NGOs call the 2030 target insufficient and note continuing coal use	Targets are defended as nationally determined, consistent with CBDR and tied to the 2053 net-zero goal
Climate finance	Developed countries stress mobilisation from all sources, including emerging economies	Ankara stresses its special circumstances and its need for finance, technology and capacity-building
Wider diplomacy	Sometimes read through geopolitical or domestic lenses	Linked to multilateral inclusiveness and UN reform ('The world is bigger than five')

Other network analyses cover the same ground from different angles, including Region Scope on COP31 and Zero Waste and The Global Anatomy on UN Security Council reform and COP31 climate diplomacy. Readers are encouraged to compare these with the primary documents: the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement texts, UN General Assembly Resolution 77/161, Türkiye's NDC submission and the TBMM records. For how this publication handles sources, see Editorial Principles and Primary-Source Standards at States Outlook.

Key Terms & Related Guides

• COP (Conference of the Parties): the annual meeting of states party to the UNFCCC, whose decisions are generally taken by consensus.
• NDC (Nationally Determined Contribution): a country's own climate pledge under the Paris Agreement, renewed every five years.
• CBDR-RC: 'common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities', the UNFCCC principle that all states share responsibility but not identically.
• Annex I / Annex II: UNFCCC lists of developed and transition economies (Annex I) and of those expected to provide finance (Annex II). Türkiye is in the former but not the latter.
• Zero Waste (Sıfır Atık): Türkiye's waste-prevention and recycling initiative, recognised through UN General Assembly Resolution 77/161.
• WEOG: the UN regional group whose turn it was to nominate the COP31 presidency.

Related guides: States Outlook: Strategic Doctrine, Treaty Law and Türkiye's Perspective, About States Outlook: Mission, Perspective and Editorial Team, States Outlook FAQ: Sources, Method and Perspective, and the sister analysis from Borders & Blocs on COP31, Zero Waste and Türkiye's climate diplomacy.

Perspective Note

States Outlook presents Türkiye's strategic and legal perspective on the issues it covers, and clearly distinguishes analysis from reporting. Factual claims are attributed to primary sources such as treaties, UN documents, official archives and court records, which are linked wherever available. Arrangements for COP31 are evolving, and readers should consult official UNFCCC and Turkish government communications for the latest confirmed details.

• Envoy Report: Ankara's Diplomatic Map: Africa, the Gulf and the Organization of Turkic States Explained — Türkiye Africa Gulf Organization of Turkic States diplomacy explained: how Ankara frames its outreach and how rivals and analysts read it, with sources.
• Regional File: COP31 and Zero Waste: What Is in Türkiye's Climate Diplomacy File? — How Türkiye's COP31 hosting in Antalya, the shared presidency arrangement and the Zero Waste initiative fit together, plus Ankara's asks on finance and status.
• Diplomatic Desk: COP31 and Zero Waste: What Türkiye's Climate Diplomacy Agenda Looks Like — How Türkiye's Zero Waste initiative, 2053 net-zero goal and COP31 hosting fit together, with the Paris Agreement context and critics' views in their own words.
• Geopolitical Horizon: Where Is Türkiye Positioning Itself in a Multipolar Order? Turkic States, Africa and the Gulf — Outlook analysis of how Türkiye uses the Organization of Turkic States, Africa and Gulf diplomacy to navigate a multipolar world while staying in NATO.